What is a thought? Where is a thought? Is consciousness a physical process and nothing more? These are just some of the initial questions posed in this branch of philosophy, known as the philosophy of mind. Each week in this introductory course has a separate focus. We shall examine rival accounts of the nature of consciousness in the first week (Cartesian dualism, various physicalist accounts, philosophical behaviourism and functionalism). The second week of the course will focus on the wider implications of the philosophy of mind and we shall examine the related problems of artificial intelligence, free will, personal identity and the problem of other minds.
The course begins with an attempt to familiarise students with our subject matter ie thinking, and we shall look at Maslin’s account of mental states (Maslin 2007: 8) to this end. We shall also watch an extract from Ken Campbell’s Channel 4 programme Brainspotting which addresses the question of where we should begin to look for an answer to the hard problem of consciousness (how can consciousness arise from the physical at all?). We shall focus on what is known in the literature as the homunculus fallacy as a philosophical razor to apply to possible accounts. The second lecture will then assess arguments in favour of dualism (the view that human beings possess a mind and a body) and we shall examine the role of what became known as Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals in various traditional arguments for dualism eg Descartes’s argument from doubt. We shall also examine some well-established criticisms of dualism (eg Hobbes’s and Hume’s criticisms). Session three will take a critical look at identity Theory and introduce the notions of qualia and intentionality. Session four examines the debate between eliminative materialism and anomalous monist positions in the philosophy of mind. Session five will introduce two possible ways of resisting the dualist-materialist stalemate, known respectively as philosophical or analytical behaviourism and functionalism.
Functionalism provides the link between sessions five and six, and we shall go on to examine issues in the artificial intelligence debate in the first session of the second week. Specifically, we shall interrogate the notion of intentionality through the Minsky-Searle debate, illustrated by the famous Chinese room thought experiment. Lectures seven and eight are preoccupied by the free will and determinism debate and we shall begin by examining some strengths and weaknesses of the materialist/determinist position before focussing on free will in session eight. The focus will remain on the philosophy of mind; for instance, we shall look at Libet’s experiment as grounds for determinism. The ninth lecture will explore the theme of personal identity in relation to the philosophy of mind and the question will be posed: do physical or psychological characteristics fare better as candidates for our continuity of identity over time? Lastly, we shall exercise ourselves over the problem of other minds and the danger of a position known as solipsism. This topic will provide an opportunity to sketch out Wittgenstein’s private language argument. There will be an opportunity at the end of the course for students to reflect and share their own views on what they conceive of consciousness to be.
What our students say
"Jon encouraged interesting debate, and dealt really well with the varied knowledge base in the student group. Would definitely take another of his courses."
