The ‘Liberal World Order’, under which we have lived for the past 30 years, has marked a remarkable period of calm in the evolution of international relations. Preceding it was a Machiavellian and Westphalian world in which sovereign states competed ruthlessly for power, and regularly went to war.
The bankruptcy of this system was made appallingly apparent by the linked calamities of the First and Second World Wars. This led directly to efforts – Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, The League of Nations, the UN – to introduce an approach to international order based more on rules and institutions and less on force. Those efforts seemed to reach fulfilment with the end of the Cold War. We have since seen the total military dominance of the United States, the spread of democracy, expanded international attention to breaches of human rights, rapid economic globalisation, and fast growing recourse to international law and institutions as the means to manage problems between states – in short the so called ‘Liberal World Order’.
But within the past decade that system has come under increasing strain. Both China and Russia have shown themselves ready to challenge US dominance. The rise of China in particular threatens a resurrection of great power competition in very much its old Cold War form. Meanwhile the rise of Islamism in the Middle East, and the chaos it has brought, have underlined the inability of the US and other powers to maintain global order and standards. Finally, the linchpin of the system, the US itself, is showing growing signs of unwillingness to continue in the role of ‘Global Policeman’ which has held the whole system together.
We look at this history, current trends, and ask whether we may be heading back towards a Machiavellian world.
Learning outcomes
- An understanding of what the ‘Liberal World Order’ is, and how it evolved;
- An understanding of the threats it now faces;
- Some insight into the developments to look out for over the next few years.
