2000 years ago, following centuries of war, 30 per cent of the world's people were subject to either the Romans or the Chinese. To support their peoples, both encouraged technological intensification. Between them, they counted the world's biggest cities. Yet, although both developed legal systems, their modes of government were quite unalike: while China pursued an ambitious vision of centralised regulation, the Romans depended on 'government without bureaucracy'. The Roman paradox can be explained, in part, by very successful propagation of ideas and, in part, on the other hand, by continuing prominence of the army. The Chinese, by contrast, gradually reduced the military's role in public affairs. Yet, although it looks as though that policy was fatal, the Romans eventually lost half of their Empire to invaders too; and, in the perspective of world history, it could be said that the two courses of events were determined by the same fundamental causes. Can we distinguish those causes?
Our explorations will begin with a general assessment of the scope for imperialism in the ancient world. Then, turning to the histories of Rome and China, we consider similarities and contrasts in the respective patterns of development. For both cases, it has long been widely assumed that events were driven by the visions and skills of exceptional leaders; but we must cross-examine this interpretation. We shall then be able to consider the contrasts in modes of government and the balances of public persuasion and force for sustaining the empires. Were they admirable achievements? Were they the effects of contradiction and weakness in either the capitals or the provinces? Was the whole surging struggle of their twin histories merely a response to opportunities or problems that embraced much more of the world than even their two vast territories?