The central question in the philosophy of mind is the question ‘What is consciousness?’ In other words what is the nature of the conscious experience going on inside your head: your perceptions, memories, hopes, emotions, sensations and decision making? We shall examine rival accounts of the nature of consciousness over this course starting with Cartesian dualism and ending with the contemporary account of functionalism. We shall examine the main arguments critically rather than merely provide a history of the subject. To this critical end, I shall play off rival accounts against each other through the course of the five sessions. Our discussions will inevitably lead to mention of other issues such as: the problem of other minds, the mind body problem, the explanatory and predictive power of belief desire psychology, artificial intelligence and whether analytic philosophy gets us anywhere.
The course begins with an attempt to familiarise students with our subject matter i.e. thinking, and to this end, we shall look at Maslin’s account of mental states (Maslin 2007: 8). We shall also watch an extract from Ken Campbell’s Channel 4 programme ‘Brainspotting’ which addresses the question of where we should begin to look for an answer to the hard problem of consciousness (how can consciousness arise from the physical at all?). We shall focus on what is known in the literature as the homunculus fallacy as a philosophical razor to apply to possible accounts. We shall assess the two main arguments in favour of Cartesian dualism (the view that human beings possess a mind and a body): Descartes’ conceivability argument and Descartes’ use of what later became Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals in various traditional arguments for dualism, e.g. Descartes’s argument from doubt. We shall also examine some well-established criticisms of dualism (e.g. Hobbes’s and Hume’s criticisms).
In the second session, we shall contrast Descartes’ dualism to the position of present-day nonCartesian dualists (most notably property dualism). We shall introduce the notions of nonreductive mental properties: qualia and intentionality. We shall focus on the central argument for property dualism known as ‘the knowledge argument’ and consider whether property dualism escapes the criticisms put to Descartes.
The third session will contrast present day property dualists to the view that mental states are one and the same thing as brain states (identity theory). We shall examine the main motivations for identity theory and whether these strengths are really strengths. Then look at the main arguments against identity theory and consider whether these objections are effective or not.
Session four examines the debate between identity theory (with anomalous monism) and eliminative materialism over the predictive and explanatory power of common-sense psychological description. We shall consider what is referred to as the hard problem of consciousness.
Session five will introduce some ways of resisting the dualist-materialist stalemate, known respectively as hard behaviourism (Hempel), soft behaviourism (Ryle) and functionalism (Putnam). Functionalism raises the question as to whether human beings are functionally equivalent to intelligent machines and we shall examine some issues in the artificial intelligence debate. Specifically, we interrogate the notion of intentionality through the Minsky-Searle exchange illustrated by the famous Chinese room thought experiment.
It is hoped that by the end of the course participants will have a clearer sense of their personal views on the nature of consciousness.
Learning outcomes
The learning outcomes for this course are:
- To gain a greater understanding of the issues raised in the course;
- To develop generic skills pertinent to formulating, defending and refining a philosophical argument (such as the precise articulation of a point);
- To develop an appreciation of being challenged to think about a familiar subject in a different way.
Classes
- What is the philosophy of mind? An introduction to Cartesian dualism.
- Cartesian dualism v property dualism.
- Property dualism v identity theory.
- Identity theory v eliminative materialism.
- Philosophical behaviourism v functionalism.
Required reading
Descartes, R. Meditations II and VI. Penguin, 2000.
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-solve-mystery-consciousness
Typical week: Monday to Friday
For each week of study you select a morning (Am) and an afternoon (Pm) course, each course has five sessions, one each day Monday to Friday. The maximum class size is 25 students. Your weekly courses are complemented by a series of two daily plenary lectures, exploring new ideas in a wide range of disciplines. To add to the learning experience, we are also planning additional evening talks and events.
| c.8.00am-9.00am |
Breakfast in College (for residents) |
| 9.00am-10.30am |
Am Course |
| 11.15am-12.30pm |
Plenary Lecture |
| 12.30pm-1.45pm |
Lunch |
| 1.45pm-3.15pm |
Pm Course |
| 4.00pm-5.15pm |
Plenary Lecture |
| c.6.00/6.15pm-7.15/7.30pm |
Dinner in College (for residents) |
| c.7.30pm onwards |
Evening talk/event |
Evaluation and Academic Credit
If you are seeking to enhance your own study experience, or earn academic credit from your Cambridge Summer Programme studies at your home institution, you can submit written work for assessment for one or more of your courses.
Essay questions are set and assessed against the University of Cambridge standard by your Course Director, a list of essay questions can be found in the Course Materials. Essays are submitted two weeks after the end of each course, so those studying for multiple weeks need to plan their time accordingly. There is an evaluation fee of £65 per essay.
For more information about writing essays see Evaluation and Academic Credit.
Certificate of attendance
A certificate of attendance will be sent to you electronically within a week of your courses finishing.
